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1 Static Nash Equilibrium




depends only on pair-wise price di⁄erences; this property
can be derived from a consumer choice model with quasi-linear preferences in money.










where 1n is a vector of ones of length n: Also, assume that the FOC is su¢ cient to




denote the corresponding vector specifying the probabilities over di⁄erent quantities
qi 2 f0;:::mg for player i:
1Lemma 1 The equilibrium path-through of an increase in marginal costs to prices is
100%. That is, if all marginal costs increase by ￿; then the Nash equilibrium prices
increase by ￿:
Proof. Firm i￿ s best response problem to set price pN




































Suppose it is satis￿ed at pN (c): Consider costs c+￿ and evaluate the FOC at prices

































where we used (1) to simplify. Hence, the FOC holds at these prices.
100% pass-through implies that pN (c) = c + const: Finally, note that the above
lemma holds even if costs are asymmetric: when ￿rms have a vector of marginal costs
c then pN (c + ￿1n) = pN (c) + ￿1n:
2 Collusive Scheme without Condition (1)
Suppose there are two ￿rms and m 2 fm;:::;mg with m > 0 and even. Moreover,
￿(m) = 1￿" and ￿(m) = ^ ￿(m)" for m > m; where ^ ￿(m) is a probability distribution
over m conditional on m > m; which is positive for all m < m ￿ m: We allow m to
be high enough so that condition (1) from the paper is violated. In words, the belief
2is that the total demand is m = m with a very high probability, but there is a right
tail of high demand realizations which could be quite long.
Consider the following collusive scheme: at the end of each period, both ￿rms
report simultaneously their sales, (r1;r2): If the sum of reports is less than m; then
￿rms move to a punishment phase. (Note the punishment does not then happen on
the equilibrium path). If the sum of reports is at least m, then if a ￿rm sold less than
m=2; it receives a payment z from the other ￿rm for every unit below m=2: In other
words, each ￿rm is promised to sell at least m=2 units and for all sales below m=2 it
is compensated with a transfer z from the other ￿rm.
To keep the formulas simple, we describe the pricing stage of the scheme for
m = 100 (so that each ￿rm is promised to sell at least 50 units), but it should be









































where in the second summation, the ￿rst term corresponds to ￿rm i being below its
quota, the second term to both ￿rms meeting their quota, and the last term to ￿rm






































3which means that conditional on m = 100 the pro￿t is as if marginal cost was c + z
rather than c, while the pro￿t expression is more complicated when m > 100. Yet,
as in the case of the lysine strategy, in the price-setting stage we can analyze prices
using this modi￿ed static game. Suppose that for every z this static game has a
unique Nash equilibrium, that is continuous in " and z: Let pN (z;") be that price.
By continuity, for small "; pN (z;") is close to pN (z;0): Assume that pN (z;0) is
strictly and increasing in z without bound (this is our assumption A4). 1 Under
these assumptions on pN (z;"), for any price ^ p it is possible to ￿nd ￿ " > 0 small
enough such that for all " ￿ ￿ " we can ￿nd a z so that in the pricing stage the ￿rms
would set a symmetric price of ^ p:
Now consider the reporting stage. If a ￿rm sells qi units it can a⁄ect its transfer
only by reporting ri < m=2, since all reports above m=2 do not a⁄ect how much it
pays (in that case payment depends on the report of the other ￿rm only).
To show that truthful reporting is incentive compatible, we need to make one
more assumption. For any qi denote by ~ R(qi) the set of the potentially pro￿table
reports, that is, report ri 2 ~ R(qi) if it is strictly less than qi and strictly less than m=2
(ri < 50 in our example). We assume that for every price pi (including o⁄-equilibrium
prices) and any qi, ￿rm i assigns positive probability to the other ￿rm selling qj such
that ri+qj < m for any ri 2 ~ R(qi): Moreover, we assume that this belief is uniformly
bounded away from zero by an amount A: In words, we assume that a ￿rm reporting
less than their quota and less than their actual sales, assigns a positive probability
that the other ￿rm sold so few units that this will make the sum of reports less than
m; which clearly indicates a deviation. A su¢ cient condition for this assumption to
hold is: a) if a ￿rm sells qi < m, it assigns a positive probability to m = m; b) if a
1Alternatively, one could assume that pN (z;") is increasing in z for any "; but that is more
di¢ cult to verify than pN (z;0) is increasing since pN (z;0) corresponds to a static Nash equilbrium
of a much simpler game. Also, while it is natural to expect that pN (z;") is increasing in z for a
small " (because the main e⁄ect of z on the static game is analogous to changes in c), for a large "
the impact of z is complex and we do not know how restrictive that assumption would be.
4￿rm sells qi > m, it assigns a positive probability to the other ￿rm selling less than
m
2 .
Next, suppose that if r1 + r2 < m then the collusive mechanism will trigger a




With that punishment, ￿rm i will not ￿nd it pro￿table to report ri < qi because the
gain is bounded from above by 50z and the loss is bounded from below by AX. The
same punishment can be used to deter ￿rms from reneging on payments.
In the dynamic game, we can implement the punishment by a threat of in￿nite
reversion to a stage game Nash equilibrium. Since the collusive scheme increases









Hence for any ^ p > pN (0;") (and " ￿ ￿ "); for ￿ su¢ ciently close to one, no ￿rm would
￿nd it pro￿table to under-report sales.
This construction gives us a semi-public perfect collusive equilibrium. Firms start
in a collusive state and are recommended to set prices (^ p; ^ p). After every period they
simultaneously report their sales. If the reports add up to at least m then any ￿rm
with sales below
m
2 is compensated by the other ￿rm with a transfer of z per unit
of shortfall. If payments are made, we move to the next period. If in any period
reports do not add up to at least m or a ￿rm reneges on payments, we switch to the
punishment state in which we play the static Nash equilibrium forever.
Note that this scheme does not respond to ￿rms over-reporting sales because these
IC reporting incentives are slack. If a ￿rm sells qi ￿ 50 then over-reporting does not
change the payo⁄s at all. If a ￿rm sells qi < 50 then over-reporting reduces the
transfer received without any compensating bene￿t because on the path there are
no punishments for low aggregate sales reports, which is di⁄erent from the lysine
strategy.
5This scheme has the desirable property that it allows ￿rms to collude using only
balanced transfers and value burning that occurs only as an o⁄-equilibrium threat
(yet, a credible one), a stark contrast with the lysine strategy we described. It is
an open question for which demand structures it is possible to construct collusive
equilibria that do not use value burning on the equilibrium path. The example in the
next section illustrates for some demand structures that it is a part of the optimal
mechanism (and in case m 2 f0;1g one can show that it is necessary for any collusive
scheme). These examples suggest a conjecture that value burning is necessary if (and
possibly only if) m = 0 is assigned a positive probability. Finally, the considerations
of value burning and incentives for over-reporting it can trigger, suggest that having
long right tail in the distribution of m is much easier to handle for the cartel than
having a long left tail.
3 Optimal Mechanism for the Two Unit Demand
Case
3.1 Model
In this section we study a model with two ￿rms, m 2 f0;1;2g and a simple demand
structure. We ￿rst consider a static model in which ￿rms can design a mechanism
specifying transfers and value destruction as a function of reported sales. The payo⁄s
from that mechanism imply an upper bound on equilibrium payo⁄s in any semi-
public equilibrium in which players report sales without delay. We then show that
if players are su¢ ciently patient that upper bound is achievable. Interestingly, the
optimal equilibria mimic the lysine strategy that we constructed for the general case.
Although the lysine strategy is unlikely to be optimal in general, we ￿nd it informative
to see that the same two main instruments are used in the optimal equilibria as in
our lysine strategy: transfers from players with higher sales to players with low sales
6and the threat of destruction of value in case total reports are low.
Taking a mechanism design approach, we focus on a highly simpli￿ed duopoly
case.2 Nature chooses the number of active buyers from the set f0;1;2g where ￿m ￿
￿(m) is the probability that demand is m 2 f0;1;2g: Each active buyer buys one
unit of output. If an active buyer is o⁄ered prices p1 and p2 then she buys from ￿rm
1 with probability ￿ (p2 ￿ p1) and from ￿rm 2 with probability 1 ￿ ￿ (p2 ￿ p1); thus,
the probability of purchase decisions depends only on the price di⁄erence. Buyers￿
purchase decisions are independent.
It is assumed ￿ is a di⁄erentiable, increasing function and ￿ (0) = 1=2: Further-
more, we assume that ￿ is such that, given the scheme we construct, the FOC of the
price-setting problem is su¢ cient for optimality.3 Using ￿ and the independence of
consumer choices we get:
  (1;1;p1;p2) = ￿ (p2 ￿ p1)
  (2;2;p1;p2) = ￿ (p2 ￿ p1)
2
  (1;2;p1;p2) = 2￿ (p2 ￿ p1)[1 ￿ ￿ (p2 ￿ p1)]:
  (0;2;p1;p2) = [1 ￿ ￿ (p2 ￿ p1)]
2
Reports are restricted so that ri 2 f0;1;2g: ￿i;j (p1;p2) will denote the probability
that q2 = j given q1 = i and ￿rms￿prices, and   (q1;m;p1;p2) is the probability of
￿rm 1 having sales of q1 given total demand is m and given ￿rms￿prices.
3.2 Characterization of an Optimal Mechanism
A collusive mechanism consists of a recommended price pair (p1;p2) and a transfer
rule that depends on reported sales. A transfer rule ft1 (r1;r2), t2 (r2;r1)g speci￿es
net transfers received by the two players conditional on the reports. The mechanism
2With some additional notation, we believe results can be extended in a straightforward manner
to when there are n ￿rms.
3See footnote 5 for discussion of su¢ cient conditions.
7is feasible if
t1 (r1;r2) + t2 (r2;r1) ￿ 0;8(r1;r2): (2)
Moreover, we restrict the transfers to be bounded:
t1 (r1;r2);t2 (r2;r1) 2 [￿x;x]; 8(r1;r2); (3)
where x > 0. Restriction (3) may be needed for the existence of an optimal mecha-
nism because total demand is inelastic. If bigger inter-￿rm transfers are more likely
to trigger an investigation by the antitrust authorities, cartel members may want to
put a bound on those transfers. Thus, the technical assumption in (3) may have an
economic rationale as well.4 The mechanism is incentive compatible if both ￿rms
￿nd it optimal to set the recommended prices and report their realized sales truth-
fully (incentive compatibility requires truthful reporting if a ￿rm follows the price
recommendation but not otherwise).
A collusive mechanism is symmetric if t1 (r1;r2) = t2 (r2;r1) = t(r1;r2) and p1 =
p2 = b p: Our goal is to describe an optimal symmetric incentive compatible feasible
collusive mechanism.
Anticipating that both ￿rms will truthfully report their sales, ￿rm 1￿ s expected
payo⁄ at the price stage is:
￿0t(0;0) + ￿1 [  (1;1)(p1 ￿ c + t(1;0)) + (1 ￿   (1;1))t(0;1)] (4)
+￿2[  (2;2)(2(p1 ￿ c) + t(2;0)) +   (1;2)(p1 ￿ c + t(1;1)) + (  (0;2))t(0;2)];
where we have suppressed the dependence of   (￿) on ￿rms￿prices. The FOC for price
4When we use the optimal mechanism to construct equilibria in the repeated game, a natural
constraint on x comes from the incentive constraints that players may renege on payments.


















[b p ￿ c + t(1;1)] +   (1;2) +















0 (0)[2(b p ￿ c) + t(2;0) ￿ t(0;2)] + 1g:
Solving it, the symmetric equilibrium price is:







[t(0;1) ￿ t(1;0)] +
￿2
￿1 + 2￿2
[t(0;2) ￿ t(2;0)]: (7)
When t(0;1) ￿ t(1;0) is higher, a ￿rm bene￿ts more from being the ￿rm with zero
demand when market demand is one. There is then an incentive for a ￿rm to raise
price and that is why the equilibrium price is increasing in t(0;1)￿t(1;0). A similar
logic explains why the equilibrium price is increasing in t(0;2) ￿ t(2;0).
Let us consider the incentive compatibility constraints (ICCs) in the reporting
stage. Suppose q1 = 2; in which case ￿rm 1 knows that ￿rm 2 sold zero units. The
ICC for truthful reporting is
t(2;0) ￿ t(1;0);t(0;0): (8)
5Su¢ cient conditions for the equilibrium price to be de￿ned by the FOC is that ￿ is linear when
it achieves values in (0;1) and transfers are not too large. When ￿ is linear, it is straightforward to
show that the SOC is
￿2￿
0 (p2 ￿ p1)
￿
￿1 + 2￿2 + ￿2￿




0 (p2 ￿ p1) > 0, then the SOC is satis￿ed as long as
t(2;0) + t(0;2) ￿ 2t(1;1) ￿ 0;
or it is su¢ ciently close to zero. This expression will equal zero for the optimal mechanism.
9When q1 = 1; the ICCs for truthful reporting are
￿1;1 (p1; b p)t(1;1)+
￿
1 ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(1;0) ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)t(2;1)+
￿




￿1;1 (p1; b p)t(1;1)+
￿
1 ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(1;0) ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)t(0;1)+
￿




￿1;1 (p1; b p) is the probability that ￿rm 1 assigns to ￿rm 2 selling one unit, given ￿rm
1 sold one unit and the price pair. By (9), ￿rm 1 prefers to report having sold one
unit than reporting two units; and by (10), ￿rm 1 prefers to report having sold one
unit than reporting zero units. It is necessary for the mechanism to be incentive
compatible that (9) and (10) hold at p1 = b p: However, that is not su¢ cient, since
the ￿rm may have a pro￿table "double-deviation"; that is, deviating with price and
report. In our construction in the proof of Theorem 3, we use only these necessary
conditions and then verify that the ￿rm has no incentive to misreport even if it
deviates in price as well.
Finally, when q1 = 0; the ICCs are
￿0;2 (p1; b p)t(0;2) + ￿0;1 (p1; b p)t(0;1) (11)
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(0;0)
￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p)t(1;2) + ￿0;1 (p1; b p)t(1;1)
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(1;0)
￿0;2 (p1; b p)t(0;2) + ￿0;1 (p1; b p)t(0;1) (12)
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(0;0)
￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p)t(2;2) + ￿0;1 (p1; b p)t(2;1)
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(2;0)
(again it is necessary that these hold for p1 = b p; and su¢ cient if they hold for all p1).
Substituting (7) into the expected payo⁄in (4), the (relaxed) problem is to choose
10a transfer function t(￿) to maximize
￿0t(0;0) + (￿1=2)[t(1;0) + t(0;1)] (13)
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿1
4
￿
[t(2;0) + 2t(1;1) + t(0;2)]
+
￿








[t(0;1) ￿ t(1;0)] +
￿




subject to the feasibility constraints (2)-(3) and the ICCs (8)-(12). The proof of
Theorem 3 is
provided at the end of the appendix.
Theorem 3: Under the assumptions of Section 5, if the high demand state is most
likely (￿2 > ￿0;￿1), an optimal symmetric mechanism is:
t(0;0) = ￿x
t(0;1) = 0;t(1;0) = ￿x
t(0;2) = x;t(2;0) = ￿x
t(1;1) = 0
t(r1;r2) = ￿x if r1 + r2 > 2
and the resulting expected ￿rm payo⁄ is:
￿




+ (￿2 ￿ ￿0)x:
If the low demand state is most likely (￿0 > ￿1;￿2), there does not exist any
symmetric mechanism yielding payo⁄s in excess of those produced by a stage
game Nash equilibrium.
When the low demand state is most likely, collusion cannot be sustained.6 We
do not have a characterization when the medium demand state is most likely (￿1 >
6As earlier work on private monitoring suggests, delay in exchanging reports will presumably be
necessary to support collusion when ￿0 > ￿1;￿2.
11￿0;￿2).7 When the high demand state is most likely, collusion can be sustained and
the optimal mechanism has the following properties. When market demand is two
units and one ￿rm sold both of those units, that ￿rm is required to make a transfer
of x to the ￿rm that sold nothing. When both ￿rms sold one unit, there are no
transfers. When market demand is one unit, the ￿rm having sold that unit incurs a
penalty of x and the other ￿rm receives no payment, so value is destroyed. Finally,
when market demand is zero, both ￿rms incur a penalty of x, and again there is an
ine¢ ciency. The remainder of this section will explore this optimal mechanism; thus,
we will be assuming ￿2 > ￿0;￿1:
This mechanism provides an upper bound on collusive equilibrium payo⁄s in our
repeated game (where transfers are not contractible so ￿rms must ￿nd it optimal
to pay them) for any symmetric semi-public perfect equilibrium with ￿rms reporting
without delays. The reason is that for any such Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium, whatever
can be achieved by using continuation payo⁄s to provide incentives, can be also
achieved in our static mechanism with transfers (which is not necessarily true for
equilibria with delays in reporting). The complication is that in the repeated game
the bound x is endogenous: for a given discount factor, if the collusive scheme calls
for ￿rm i to pay too much (either as a transfer to the other ￿rm or as value burning),
it will prefer to renege since punishments are bounded by the di⁄erence between
the best and worst equilibrium payo⁄s. A di⁄erent way of bounding x arises if we
assume that the demand is inelastic up to some choke price and drops down to zero
above that price (as we discussed in Section 2 of the paper, this is a more realistic
assumption than the demand being perfectly inelastic for all prices). For ^ p in (7)
not to exceed the choke price it must be that transfers do not exceed some level,
giving us an upper bound on x: Since that bound is independent of ￿; it leads to an
upper bound on per-period collusive payo⁄s that is independent of ￿: For example, it
7When ￿1 > ￿0;￿2, we can characterize an optimal mechanism when a ￿rm deviates in its price
or in its reports, but a mechanism immune to deviating simultaneously in price and report has thus
far alluded us. The di¢ culty is in verifying that there are no pro￿table double deviations.
12means that if m = 0 is the most likely level of market demand, there does not exist
a symmetric semi-public perfect equilibrium without delay with payo⁄s higher than
the static Nash payo⁄.
Our use of a static mechanism design approach to bound payo⁄s in a repeated
game in analogous to what is done in Levin (2003). In Section IV he studies a
principal-agent model in which the agent￿ s performance is privately observed by the
principal. He describes relational contracts that have the "full performance review"
property, that is contracts in which the principal reports after every period (following
the tradition in repeated games literature we refer to such strategies as semi-public
perfect equilibria without delay). In his setup, requiring full-performance review is
limiting and indeed delaying reports can improve e¢ ciency - see footnote 22 in Levin
(2003) and the discussion there, as well as Fuchs (2007). In his model value burning is
always necessary to induce both e⁄ort and truthful reporting. The critical di⁄erence
from our model is that on the agent￿ s side he has moral hazard only in actions and on
the principal￿ s side only moral hazard in reports. In our model both moral hazards
are on both sides of the market, which signi￿cantly complicates the analysis. A paper
related to this issue is MacLeod (2003), which also studies a principal-agent problem
but he has both the agent and the principal observe private signals of performance.
He shows that if the signals are correlated, e¢ ciency can be improved. That suggests
that in our game one could exploit the details of the correlation in realized quantities
to improve upon the lysine strategy (the case of m being known or m being bounded
away from zero are extreme cases of such a correlation and we have discussed how
that can be explored).
To ￿nish this section, we show how the optimal static mechanism for a given x can
be implemented as a semi-public perfect equilibrium of an in￿nitely repeated game
if ￿ is high enough and m = 2 is the most likely outcome. De￿ne
v ￿
￿




+ (￿2 ￿ ￿0)x; v
N ￿
￿




as the per period expected payo⁄ for the optimal mechanism and the stage Nash
13equilibrium, respectively. When both ￿rms report zero sales, each ￿rm is supposed







; we then want to realize that penalty with a probability
such that the expected foregone value equals t(0;0). Hence, when (r1;r2) = (0;0),











￿ (￿2 ￿ ￿0)
:
If (r1;r2) = (1;0) then ￿rm 1 is to pay x and ￿rm 2 has a zero transfer. To implement
it, assume ￿rm 1 transfers x=2 to ￿rm 2 and the probability the equilibrium shifts to













2￿ (￿2 ￿ ￿0)
:
Thus, ￿rm 1 incurs a penalty of x - as it pays x=2 to ￿rm 2 and incurs an expected
loss of x=2 from possible cartel breakdown - while ￿rm 2 experiences no net transfer
as it receives x=2 from ￿rm 2 but incurs an expected loss of x=2 from possible cartel
breakdown. Finally, if (r1;r2) = (2;0) then ￿rm 1 simply transfers x to ￿rm 2. This
strategy pro￿le implements the optimal mechanism and is an equilibrium i⁄
1 ￿ ￿
￿ (￿2 ￿ ￿0)
￿ 1 , ￿ ￿
1
1 + ￿2 ￿ ￿0
:
Note that the smaller is ￿2 ￿ ￿0, the more patient ￿rms have to be.
To summarize, assume ￿2 > ￿0;￿1 and ￿rms are su¢ ciently patient,
￿ ￿
1
1 + ￿2 ￿ ￿0
:
Substituting the transfer function from Theorem 3 into (7), the equilibrium price is





14The equilibrium probability of cartel breakdown is
￿(r1 + r2) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
1￿￿
￿(￿2￿￿0) if r1 + r2 = 0
1￿￿
2￿(￿2￿￿0) if r1 + r2 = 1
0 if r1 + r2 = 2
1￿￿
￿(￿2￿￿0) if r1 + r2 > 2
and inter-￿rm payments are:





The properties of this optimal equilibrium match those of the lysine strategy
pro￿le quite closely. First, the payment scheme is linear in the number of units; a
￿rm transfers an amount x=2 to the other cartel member for each unit it reports
having sold. Of particular note is that payments depend only on a ￿rm￿ s own sales
report. Second, the probability of cartel breakdown depends only on the aggregate
sales report, and is linear for equilibrium values:
￿(r1 + r2) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿
2￿ (￿2 ￿ ￿0)
￿
(2 ￿ r1 ￿ r2):
3.3 Proof of Theorem 3
The way in which we will proceed is to consider a less constrained problem with a
strict subset of the ICC and feasibility constraints. Once the mechanism is charac-
terized, we￿ ll show that the remaining ICC and feasibility constraints are satis￿ed.
15Speci￿cally, we seek to maximize
max
jt(r1;r2)j￿x





[t(2;0) + 2t(1;1) + t(0;2)]
+
￿














subject to these constraints:
t(2;0) ￿ t(1;0) (15)
t(2;0) ￿ t(0;0) (16)
￿t(1;1) + (1 ￿ ￿)t(1;0) ￿ ￿t(0;1) + (1 ￿ ￿)t(0;0) (17)
0 ￿ t(0;2) + t(2;0) (18)
0 ￿ t(1;1) (19)
0 ￿ t(0;1) + t(1;0) (20)
0 ￿ t(0;0) (21)
(15)-(17) are the ICCs ensuring that a ￿rm does not want to under-report its sales.
￿ ￿ ￿1;1 (p;p) so that (17) is (10) when evaluated at equilibrium prices. (18)-(21) are
the feasibility constraints for when aggregate sales reports do not exceed 2.
The problem is then to choose t(0;0);t(1;0);t(0;1);t(2;0);t(1;1); and t(0;2)
to maximize (14) subject to (15)-(21). Note that (14) is increasing in t(1;1) and that
t(1;1) enters only (17) and (19). A higher value increases the maximand and loosens
(17). Hence, (19) must be binding. Optimality then requires:
t(1;1) = 0: (22)
Next note that (14) is increasing in t(0;2) and that t(0;2) enters only (18). If
x > t(0;2) then optimality requires (18) to bind:
t(2;0) + t(0;2) = 0: (23)
16If x = t(0;2) then, by (18), it follows that t(2;0) = ￿x: Again, t(2;0) + t(0;2) = 0:
Optimality then requires (23).
Using (22)-(23), de￿ning s = t(0;2) = ￿t(2;0); and simplifying, we can re-state
(14) as choosing t(0;0);t(1;0); t(0;1); and s (all in [￿x;x]) to maximize:
￿




+ ￿0t(0;0) + ￿1t(0;1) + ￿2s (24)
subject to
￿s ￿ t(1;0) (25)
￿s ￿ t(0;0) (26)
(1 ￿ ￿)t(1;0) ￿ ￿t(0;1) + (1 ￿ ￿)t(0;0) (27)
0 ￿ t(0;1) + t(1;0) (28)
0 ￿ t(0;0) (29)
Suppose (27) was not binding:
(1 ￿ ￿)t(1;0) > ￿t(0;1) + (1 ￿ ￿)t(0;0):
Even if (28) is binding, we can raise t(0;1) and lower t(1;0) (note that (25) will still
be satis￿ed) so as to satisfy (28) and, because (24) is increasing in t(0;1); the payo⁄
is higher. The only caveat to the preceding argument is if t(0;1) = x; in which case
t(0;1) cannot be increased. But then, by (28), it follows that t(1;0) = ￿x: In that
case, (27) takes the form:
(1 ￿ ￿)t(1;0) ￿ ￿t(0;1) + (1 ￿ ￿)t(0;0) ,





which is a contradiction since t(0;0) ￿ ￿x: Hence, (27) must be binding:
(1 ￿ ￿)t(1;0) = ￿t(0;1) + (1 ￿ ￿)t(0;0) ,






where, using Bayes Rule,
￿ =
￿2  (1;2)
￿2  (1;2) + ￿1  (1;1)
=
￿2 (1=2)





Using (30) to substitute for t(1;0) in (24), the problemis now to choose t(0;0);t(0;1);
and s to maximize:
￿




+ ￿0t(0;0) + ￿1t(0;1) + ￿2s (31)
subject to






￿s ￿ t(0;0) (33)






0 ￿ t(0;0) (35)
If an optimum has s < 0 then, since (31) is increasing in s, it must be the case
that (32) and/or (33) are binding. By (35), if (33) binds then s ￿ 0 which is a














which violates (34). Therefore, it cannot be the case that s < 0: We conclude that
an optimum must have s ￿ 0:
Suppose 0 > t(0;1): Since (31) is increasing in t(0;1) then one of the constraints
must bind. It follows from 0 > t(0;1) and (35) that (34) does not bind. When
0 > t(0;1); (33) binds before (32) which implies (32) does not bind. Thus, neither of
18the constraints involving t(0;1) bind which means (31) can be increased by raising
t(0;1): We conclude that t(0;1) ￿ 0 at an optimum.
To summarize the properties of an optimum derived thus far:









t(0;2) = ￿t(2;0) = s ￿ 0:
t(0;1) ￿ 0 implies that if (34) holds then (35) holds which makes (35) redundant;
and if (32) holds then (33) holds which makes (33) redundant. The problem is then:
choose s; t(0;0); and t(0;1) to maximize
￿




+ ￿0t(0;0) + ￿1t(0;1) + ￿2s
subject to












where (32) has been rearranged. First note that it is not an optimum for t(0;1)￿s >
0: In that case, (37) implies (36) is not binding. Since t(0;1) > s implies s < x, s can
be increased which raises the objective while continuing to satisfy the constraints.
Therefore, t(0;1)￿s ￿ 0. Hence, if (36) holds then (37) holds, and, at an optimum,
s ￿ t(0;1):
Thus, the problem is: choose s; t(0;0); and t(0;1) to maximize
￿




+ ￿0t(0;0) + ￿1t(0;1) + ￿2s
19subject to






s ￿ t(0;1) ￿ 0
0 ￿ t(0;0)
By including the constraint s ￿ t(0;1), we ensure that satisfaction of (36) implies (37)
holds. Suppose the ￿rst constraint does not bind at the optimum. As the objective
is increasing in s, it must be the case that s = x: Hence, the constraint becomes:






but this cannot hold since t(0;0) ￿ ￿x and t(0;1) ￿ 0: We conclude that the
constraint binds:






Therefore, the problem is: choose s; t(0;0); and t(0;1) to maximize
￿




+ ￿0t(0;0) + ￿1t(0;1) + ￿2s (38)
subject to






s ￿ t(0;1) ￿ 0 (40)
0 ￿ t(0;0) (41)
￿ Assume ￿2 > ￿0;￿1:
Suppose t(0;0) > ￿x: Since we￿ ve shown that, at an optimum, t(0;1) ￿ 0 then
x > s by (39). But the objective can be increased by raising s by " > 0 (which is
possible since s < x) and lowering t(0;0) by ". The objective goes up by (￿2 ￿ ￿0)" >
0 and, in addition, (39) still holds. Therefore, t(0;0) = ￿x:
20We now have that, at an optimum, t(0;0) = ￿x and we previously showed
s;t(0;1) ￿ 0: (39) is now






Use this condition to substitute for s in (38):
￿



























Substituting for s in (40), we get











The problem is then: choose t(0;1) to maximize
￿
















x ￿ t(0;1): (43)
Since ￿2 > ￿1 then (42) is decreasing in t(0;1): By the derived condition that
t(0;1) ￿ 0; an optimum has t(0;1) = 0: (Also note that since t(0;0) = ￿x and
s ￿ x, (39) would be violated if t(0;1) < 0:) From t(0;0) = ￿x and t(0;1) = 0; it
follows from (39) that s = x:
If ￿2 > ￿0;￿1 then the solution is
t(0;0) = ￿x
t(0;1) = 0;t(1;0) = ￿x
t(0;2) = x;t(2;0) = ￿x
t(1;1) = 0
and the objective takes the value:
￿




+ ￿0t(0;0) + ￿1t(0;1) + ￿2s
=
￿




+ (￿2 ￿ ￿0)x
21To complete the analysis, we need to ensure that the remaining ICC and feasi-
bility constraints are satis￿ed. For that purpose, we extend the transfer function to
encompass sales reports that sum to more than two.
t(0;0) = ￿x (44)
t(0;1) = 0;t(1;0) = ￿x;
t(0;2) = x;t(2;0) = ￿x
t(1;1) = 0
t(r1;r2) = ￿x if r1 + r2 > 2
Notice that all feasibility constraints are satis￿ed.
Referring back to the complete set of ICCs, the ones that we still need to verify
are satis￿ed are, for all p1;8
￿1;1 (p1; b p)t(1;1) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(1;0) (45)
￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)t(2;1) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(2;0)
￿1;1 (p1; b p)t(1;1) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(1;0) (46)
￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)t(0;1) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(0;0)
￿0;2 (p1; b p)t(0;2) + ￿0;1 (p1; b p)t(0;1) (47)
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(0;0)
￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p)t(1;2) + ￿0;1 (p1; b p)t(1;1)
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(1;0)
￿0;2 (p1; b p)t(0;2) + ￿0;1 (p1; b p)t(0;1) (48)
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(0;0)
￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p)t(2;2) + ￿0;1 (p1; b p)t(2;1)
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
t(2;0)
8Actually, we have already veri￿ed that (46) holds for p1 = b p:
22Substituting (44) into (45),
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)
￿
x ￿ ￿￿1;1 (p1; b p)x ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿1;1 (p1; b p)
￿
x , ￿1;1 (p1; b p) ￿ 0;
which holds. Next consider (46):
￿
￿








￿0;2 (p1; b p)x￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
x ￿ ￿￿0;2 (p1; b p)x￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
x ,
￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿￿0;2 (p1; b p):
Finally, consider (48):
￿0;2 (p1; b p)x ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿0;2 (p1; b p) ￿ ￿0;1 (p1; b p)
￿
x ￿ ￿x , 2￿0;2 (p1; b p) + ￿0;1 (p1; b p) ￿ 0:
We conclude that if ￿2 > ￿0;￿1 then (44) is an optimal mechanism.
￿ Assume ￿0 > ￿1;￿2:
Return to (38) with constraints (39)-(41). Suppose t(0;0) = 0: Since we￿ ve already
shown that, at an optimum, s;t(0;1) ￿ 0; then (39) implies s = 0 = t(0;1). Let
us see if there is a better solution. Thus, suppose t(0;0) < 0. t(0;0) < 0 and (39)
imply t(0;1) > 0 and/or s > 0: If t(0;1) > 0 then (40) implies s > 0: Hence, at an
optimum, if t(0;0) < 0 then s > 0: If (40) is not binding - speci￿cally, if s > t(0;1) -
then (38) can be increased by reducing s by " and raising t(0;0) by "; the objective
goes up by (￿0 ￿ ￿2)" > 0 and (39) still holds. Given then that s = t(0;1), the
problem is to choose t(0;0) and s to maximize
￿




+ ￿0t(0;0) + (￿1 + ￿2)s
subject to






23Substituting this constraint into the objective, the problem is to choose t(0;0) and s
to maximize ￿

















Since ￿1 ￿ ￿0 < 0 then (49) is decreasing in s. Given (50), t(0;0) should be set as
high as possible, which implies t(0;0) = 0 and, therefore, s = 0: The best solution is
then:
t(0;0) = 0;t(0;1) = 0;t(1;0) = 0;t(0;2) = 0;t(2;0) = 0;t(1;1) = 0:
Hence, if ￿0 > ￿1;￿2 then no collusion can be sustained.
24